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ABSTRACT
Nagrale, Sumedh Sopan. M.S.E.E, Department of Electrical Engineering, Wright State University, 2019.
Two Player Zero Sum Multi-Stage Game Analysis Using Coevolutionary Algorithm.
A New Two player zero sum multistage simultaneous Game has been developed from a real-life sit-
uation of dispute between two individual. Research identifies a multistage game as a multi-objective
optimization problem and solves it using Coevolutionary algorithm which converges to a solution from
pareto optimal solution. A comparison is done between individual stage behaviour and multistage be-
haviour. Further, simulations over a range for Crossover rate, Mutation rate and Number of interaction
is done to narrow down the range for a range with optimal computation speed. A relationship has been
observed which identifies a relationship between population size, number of interactions, crossover rate,
mutation rate and computational time. A point from the obtained range is then selected and applied to a
new game to see if the point from the narrowed range works.
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Chapter 1
Background
Background primarily introduces reader with the terms, topics and concepts involved in the Thesis
and contemporary work in Game Theory.
1.1 Game Theory
Game Theory translates real life situations of decision making in the form of game, which can be
sometime seen as a simplified representation of the same idea considering all significant components
involved.[14]
Game theory has been extensively studied field mainly in economics, However if one investi-
gates, one can find its interconnections with and application over a broad range of fields. Game
theory analyses decision making of two or more players who interact with each other based on the
pay-off received by their action in the game [5].
Such a strategic interactions between individuals or groups are quite common in real life,So one
can see that there has been presence of Game Theory for a long time. However, The foremost formal
representation of games and solutions were presented by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) in
their book ”Theory of games and economic behaviour” [27], which analyses zero sum game. Fol-
lowed by John Nash’s dissertation [15], which establishes the presence of a Nash equilibria for a
game where no player is benefited by deviated from the equilibria strategy.
In the year 1954, O.G. Haywood used game theory to analyse the military decisions used in the
Battle of the Bismarck Sea, a battle fought during the World War II [10]. The predicted outcome of
the game was same as the actual outcome of the war. Apart from wars Game Theory has it’s presence
everywhere where one can find any sort of decision making. From Economics (In order to under-
stand the behaviour of companies in a given market) to international relationship (Current trade war
is rational on basis of Game theory) to Engineering (Coordination of Robots) to Medical Science to a
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problem such Co2 emission. Another example will be bargaining at a shop. Each player involved in
the game is rational enough to make his profit maximum. (seller trying to sell it at maximum price,
buyer trying to buy at minimum price.).
In order to understand more about games and an overview will be followed of the common and
essential terms which are used in Game Theory. This serves two fold purpose, firstly,it gives an clear
understanding of the terms used in the research for the individuals new to the topic and secondly, it
removes ambiguity if any that would have been presented in the text otherwise.
Terms
1. Action: Actions are the choices available for a player to select from while playing a game.
2. Move: Actual Action selected from the action set is called Move.
3. Play: The entire sequence of Moves for a player from initial point to the final state of the game
is called play.
4. Terminal State: Terminal State is the state from where a game does not move forward.
5. Strategies: Strategies are the set of action or just an action that a player takes while playing a
game. Strategies may be deterministic, probabilistic, conditional or behavioural.
(a) Pure Strategy: Pure strategy is a deterministic strategy when a player plays same action
set each time it plays the game.
(b) Mixed Strategy: Mixed strategy is a probabilistic strategy which assigns a probability
distribution to the pure strategy. This means the player will make a move with certain
probability. This means player may make different move when the game is played.
(c) Conditional Strategy: Conditional strategy is the one in which player decide their strategy
in next stage based on the strategy of the other player on the current stage.
(d) Behavioural strategy: Mixed strategy is the one in which probability distribution is ap-
plied to the pure strategy.Which is also called as Global randomization.Whereas, Be-
havioural strategy assigns probability to individual information set (for more information
refer extensive form representation describes in the next section), such that the actions
available will follow that probability distribution.
(e) Dominates:(Dominant)[7] An action B dominates A : If B gives as good as or better
payoff than A for opponent’s actions.(B≥A)
i. B strictly dominates A: Action B always gives better payoff than A.(B > A)
ii. B weakly dominates A: There is at least one set of opponents’ action for which B is
superior, and all other sets of opponents’ actions give B the same payoff as A.(B > A
for at least one,B=A, for rest).
2
[Strategy B is strictly dominant: If strategy B strictly dominates every other possible
strategy. Strategy B is weakly dominant: If strategy B dominates all other strategies, but
some (or all) strategies are only weakly dominated by B.]
6. Rationality: A player playing a game can be rational or irrational. A player is rational if the
player plays for profiting itself, Whereas an irrational player could simply play with random
guess with particular aim of maximising its profit.
(a) Individual Rationality:
A player is said to be rational if it maximises its expected pay-off.
(b) Group Rationality:
In case of coalition games, where players form coalition. A group of players are called
as group rational or efficient when the total payoff (does not exceeds total eligible payoff
available) is equal to the sum of the payoff received by the individual players
7. Information: knowledge a players have about the game i.e about the available actions, number
of players and about the decision it took.
Complete Information: All players know everything about each other. The following is the
common knowledge
(a) Players who are playing the game
(b) Their utilities.
(c) Players strategies
(d) Type of players
Incomplete information: Information players have are
(a) His true payoff
(b) Other player’s mean payoff (beliefs or knowledge of payoff with small random fluctua-
tions) and player’s Identity.
Information player may not know
(a) Type of other player
(b) Strategies of the other player
(c) Exact payoff of other player.(knows mean payoff)
(d) rules of the game are not well defined (strategy unknown)
Higher Order of incomplete information:
Rules of the game can be considered as higher order of incomplete information. Different
players may have beliefs about the game that is being played.
Game Classification
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1. Based on Moves
Depending upon the moves of the game we have
(a) Simultaneous Game:
All players make their move simultaneously. These are games of imperfect information.
Player doesn’t know what action is taken by other player.
(b) Sequential Game:
Players make one move after other in a sequence. Sequential games in which player can
not observe the action taken by other player can also be treated as simultaneous game.
2. Based on Payoff
Depending on the payoff each player receives for playing the game.
(a) Zero sum Game: This are games of pure conflict. This means one’s loss is other player’s
profit. The sum of payoff received by the players is equal to zero.
(b) Constant sum Game: The sum of payoff received by the players is equal to constant.
3. Based on Information
(a) Perfect Information: Player knows previous decisions of all players including his own
before he has to make the next move. In such a case the game is of perfect information.
(b) Imperfect Information: Player forgets what decision he took earlier in the game or he does
not know decision that is being made by other player (as in case of simultaneous game).
However, they know: who the other player are, their strategies and payoffs. Information
about other player in imperfect information may be complete.
Game Representation
Game can be represented in various ways, depending upon the information we have regarding the
game. Game is defined based on Number of players, Actions available for those players, Payoff
for the players and Rules applicable to the games. Using this definition a game can be represented
in various forms, representation are based on the information available to players. A Game can be
represented using the following forms:
1. Normal Form
2. Extensive Form
3. Beyond Normal/Extensive Form
(a) Stochastic Games
(b) Bayesian Games
(c) Congestion Games
(d) Multistage Games
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(e) Repeated Games
Normal form Games: It describes all possible strategies and utility of the agents against eachother.
It shows strategic interactions between the players. It consists of
1. Set of players
2. All strategies of the players
3. Payoff received by players for the actions.
An Example of Normal Form representation for Rock-Paper-Scissor game
Extensive Form Games
Player 1
Player 2
R P S
R 0, 0 −1, 1 1,−1
P 1,−1 0, 0 −1, 1
S −1, 1 1,−1 0, 0
Table 1.1: 3x3 Matrix: Rock-Paper-Scissor Normal-Form Game
Extensive Form is a tree like structure. It consists of
1. All Players
2. Player’s Strategy mixed or pure
3. Payoff received by players for the actions
It gives detailed information about the game such as
1. Simultaneous or sequential game
2. Complete or incomplete information.
3. Perfect or imperfect information
4. Pure or mixed strategy.
Figure 1.1 describes the details of the extensive form games where few of the common terms used
have been explained.
1. Decision Node: Where a player chooses an action.
2. Chance Node: Where Nature or chance chooses an action
3. End Node: Where there are no more decision to be made or simply the last node.
4. Information set: Information set consists of nodes for a player, Information set may include one
or more nodes. Players are unable to distinguish between the nodes in the same information
set.
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Beyond Normal-Extensive Form
1. Multistage Game A multi-stage game is a finite sequence of stage-games, each one being a
game of complete but imperfect information (a simultaneous move game).
For a Multistage game
(a) Each stage game is complete and with imperfect information.
(b) All players observe the outcome of each stage game, This is common knowledge for the
players
2. Repeated Games: A special case of multistage game is the one in which same game is played
over and over again in each stage. A repeated can be of one of the following types
(a) Finitely Repeated Games
(b) Infinitely Repeated Games
3. Stochastic Games: Stochastic games are also called as Markov games. There are two differ-
ences between MDP and Stochastic Game is the number of decision maker.
(a) In case of MDP we had single decision maker, however in case of Stochastic games we
have multiple decision maker.
(b) We change state in MDP, However in Stochastic games we change Stages (games) So
Markov game is also a multistage game.
4. Bayesian Games: Bayesian games are the one with the incomplete information. Players select
their strategies according to Bayes’s rule.
5. Congestion Games: Players playing the game will have same strategies available.
6
1.2 Solution Concept
Rationality of the player plays an important role in the development of a solution which could be
termed as optimal or beneficial. The solution of a game is the set of strategies (action taken by the
each player in the game as in totality) depends upon multiple factors which can be stated below
1. Are the Players Rational or Irrational?
2. Up to what extent players have knowledge about game?
3. Is the game a Complete or incomplete game?
4. Is the game Perfect or imperfect game?
1.2.1 Minimax Theorem:
Minimax theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern says that, given a two-person zero-sum game,
there is always a pair of strategies, either in pure or mixed strategies, such that the maximin payoff
equals the minimax payoff of player 1.In two person zero-sum games the maximin payoff of player 2
with respect to his own payoff values is identical to the minimax value with respect to the payoffs of
player.
1.2.2 Nash Equilibrium
For a finite game, with finite number of players with finite strategies each, there exists an equilibrium
strategies such that no one player can get higher payoff by deviating from the equilibrium strate-
gies.This strategic equilibrium consist of best response of players and is called as Nash equilibrium.
Nash equilibrium hinges on two assumption of a player
1. Other players are rational
2. Other players chooses the equilibrium such that it is the best response.
1.2.3 Rationalization
Rationalisation is the process which involves iterative deletions of such strategies which won’t be the
best response to any belief of the other player’s move.[19] [7] It hinges on:
1. Other players are rational.
2. Rationality is common knowledge.
A strictly dominated action is a never-best response and state that a rational player won’t play it if he
is rational. A set of rationalize action is obtained by Iterated Elimination of these strictly dominated
actions.If all the players are left with one strategy at the end of iterated elimination of dominated
action then the game is called a dominance-solvable game.
Note:
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1. Nash equilibrium is a rationalizable equilibrium; however, the inverse is not true.Thus Ratio-
nalizability is a Generalization of Nash Equilibrium.
2. An action that is not rationalizable can never be a best response to any opponent’s strategy
(pure or mixed)
3. The variation of the process includes deletion of both strict and weakly dominated strategies.
The sequence in which the weakly dominated actions are deleted will reflect on the rationalized
actions.
Zero sum Game
1. In case of zero sum game, Nash equilibrium is same as Minimax theorem.
2. In two person zero-sum games the maximin payoff of player 2 with respect to his own payoff
values is identical to the minimax value with respect to the payoffs of player.
3. If the payoff values of the two players in each cell add to the same constant value, then the
game is equivalent to a zero-sum game and can, without loss of information, be transformed
into such a game.
4. There is atleast one mixed Nash equilibrium in a game.
Multistage Game:
As stated earlier repeated game is a special case of multistage game. A multistage game is the one
in which all the stages may not be different. Each stage is complete with imperfect information. All
players can observe the outcome of the game which is the common knowledge of the game.[26]
Solution to a multistage game
Consider a Multistage Game with N-stage games where each stage has Nash equilibrium asN1, N2...NN .
The sequence of outcomes determines total payoff received by an individual. which is also called as
strategic link. Players may use this strategic link to gain more payoff. This may led to a solution
which is not always a Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Discounting or impatience factor: Discounting: The discounting factor defines importance given
by the players on the future rewards comparable to present terms. Usually it is a convention that
payoffs which are further away in the future are worth less than the payoffs obtained earlier in the
sequence of play, However, this is not necessarily be true. This is the notion of discounting, or impa-
tience, means that todays game is played now, and is certain to occur, but there is some uncertainty
about tomorrows game actually occurring. Say, If two players are playing a game in period one, there
may be some probability δ ¡ 1 that tomorrows game will indeed be played, however, with probability
1 δ it will not. This causes the following scenario
8
1. Utility = u ,if game is played with probability δ.
2. Utility = 0 ,if game is not played.
Expectedutility = δu
For a N stage Multistage game in 1, 2, ..., T. for δ = 1, future is as important as present whereas if δ ¡
1, present is more valued than future game.
1. What is the need to deviate from Nash equilibrium?
Nash equilibrium gives a solution which is a best reply to each player.However, This does
not mean to be the payoff with highest value. So players may wish to deviate from the Nash
equilibrium and obtain a higher payoff.
2. What influences this selection of Non-Nash solution strategies?
Two elements that are crucial to support certain strategies in the stages of game(early periods
in general) which is not a Nash equilibrium. Multiplicity of Nash equilibrium in 2nd stage:
There must be at least two distinct equilibria in the second stage: which can act as a
A) Stick (punishment::low payoff): Stick ensures no one deviates from the proposed path of
play for short term gains. Sticks leads to a long term loss, if deviated.
B) Carrot (reward::higher payoff): Carrot motivates to stay on the proposed path of play.
The discount factor has to be large enough:
The long term losses must be large enough to discourage any deviation, As we know this is
controlled by discount factor. So a discount factor must be large enough to avoid any deviation.
1.3 Contemporary
As described in the work of Holler [11], in which he views game theory into three different stages
depending on the rationale of the stakeholders involved in the game. These three stages are Classical,
Modern and New Game theory. In case of classical stage, individual rationality is considered, In
Modern, player believes not only he is rational but the other player involved in the process are rational
to an extent where Nash equilibrium is possible and New in which player knows little about the other
player, i.e other player’s rationality, it forms his beliefs of the other player. Repeated games have been
analysed in [2] [16] . A repeated game is a special case of Multistage game where each stage game is
same. Traditional solutions involves presence of carrot and punishment in the payoff to deviate from
Nash and gain better payoff which is described above. Apart from this, techniques described in [6]
[13] [16] [28] [23] [1] can be used to solve the game and further , an existence of Nash equilibrium for
infinite repeated games has been discussed in [21].Genetic algorithm has been used to find a solution
for the game theoretic problems. The research is described in [4], [3], [9]
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2
Introduction
The purpose of the research is to model real life competitive situations such as fight between individ-
uals or companies or countries in the form of game and solve it in order to predict the outcome based
on the rational optimal strategy.
The game developed on such a competitive situation is a zero sum simultaneous multi-stage game.
This is a multi-stage game since a move causes a transition from one stage to another. Most of the
contemporary work is done on single stage game or a repeated game as described is a special case of
Multi-stage game where all stages are same.
This research mainly focuses on Multistage game with different stages where individual should
have capabilities to play under all the stages. It is seen from the work of ”Game Theory Based Coevo-
lutionary Algorithm”,[24] a CoEvolutionary algorithm can be applied to mimic the process of natural
selection within the individuals and between the individuals in order to find a solution to the game for
a single stage game. Here developed game is a multistage game which results in a Multi-objective
optimisation problem instead of single objective optimisation problem. This problem is overcome by
simply treating composite function as a single function.
First, Individual stages have been analysed treating them as a single-objective optimisation prob-
lem. The behaviour of the agents are observed and then compared with the behaviour corresponding
to multi-stage setting. The game theoretic solutions shows that the zero sum game has infinite so-
lutions set spread over certain actions, which reflects on simulations of Individual stage case where
convergence occurs over a range of strategies. However this is different in case of multi-stage game
where algorithm converges to a single strategy.
Further, A novel mathematical relationship has been developed based for coevolutionary which
provides a relationship between population size, Interactions, crossover rate, mutation rate and com-
putational time. This relationships holds good irrespective of game under consideration since it is
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based on algorithm rather problem specific, however depending on the selection techniques used in
coevolution, equation may be needed to be modified to suit the situation better. This equation can
predict time for the game without simulations.
A dataset is obtained based on simulation over a range of Mutation rate, Crossover rate and in-
teractions for the multi-stage game. This along with the equation is then used to identify a set of
parameters which can be used for games developed on the similar lines of the current game. This set
of Parameters is then applied to a new game and hypothesis of reuse of parameters has been verified
however with a cautious note that stages must be of similar nature i.e must have a common solution
set of optimal strategies.
At Last, A brief commentary on the game is done with respect to the Multiple task learning, and
how the game reflects the learning behaviour of an intelligent agent along with the discussion on
future research work.
The remaining of the chapter adds on to the research described above, a brief overview of the
chapter and their contents is as follows
1. Game 1: Attacker’s Game or Horizontal Movement Game:
Game description, its representation and game theoretic solution.
2. Methodology:
Includes reason to use Coevolutionary algorithm along with the details such as selection tech-
nique and fitness calculation
3. Simulation:
The application of coevolutionary algorithm to the game for individual cases and multiple
stages and their comparison. Change of parameters and its effect on the convergence, Mathe-
matical derivation for the relation between computational time and parameters
4. Game 2: Future Extension Movement Game:
Game 2 description and simulation using a point from selected parameter range.
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3
Game 1: Attacker’s Game or
Horizontal Movement Game
A real life situation is simplified into the form of a game. The basic concept of the game is the dispute
between individuals or group. Horizontal Movement Game or simply Attack Game consists of two in-
dividuals which can have one of the following movements from the action set {Right, Left,Block,Attack}.
As the name suggests the game is restricted to the horizontal movement.Game is a deterministic game,
i.e is the one in which if one takes certain actions he will reach to a unique result. There is no ran-
domness in the process.
3.0.1 Players
Player4and Player5 .
3.0.2 Environment
Zero sum Two player deterministic game is played in the following environment. There are three
positions in the grid possible for the player to be in
3.0.3 Actions
Actions available for the players are
1. Right : Player moves to the right
2. Left : Player moves to the left
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3. Block : Player tries to block the anticipated attack
4. Attack: Player Attacks.
The player is restricted to move in upward or downward direction.
3.0.4 States
Based on the players(5 and4) and Action set (R,L,B,A) the number of states are defined as follows:
The game consists of the following environment
Figure 3.1: Game I States and their equivalent representation s0,s1,s2
3.0.5 Representation choice
Conventionally, the states would have been defined in the terms of relative positions, which would
lead to 9 individual states. The way we have defined the game is to condense the state into a single
one which has same normal form. This is done by considering the independence of the movement
in the horizontal direction. The only difference between the way in which we have defined is the
transition of the agents into different states this happens because of occurrence of invalid state in the
conventional game representation.
3.0.6 Utility
The game is defined as Zero sum Game, and hence one player loss is the other player’s gain.The
payoff matrix is defined for each state.
Since the game is a zero sum game,
u4(action1, action2) = −u5(action1, action2)
The normal form representation is given the next section. Values of the payoff is based on the
action each player selects.
3.0.7 Normal form representation of the states
The Normal form shows the payoff received.As this is a zero sum game the loss of one player is gain
of other player. Energy or cost required by the player to play block is less as compared to attack,
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whereas there is no cost for the movement.
P4 is the first player, and P5 is the second player. However this does not imply the game is
played in sequence. The game is simultaneous game.Declaring the payoff of the other player is not
required since its a zero sum game. They can be omitted or shown as follows:
P4
P5
R L B A
R (0, 0) (0, 0) ( 12 ,−
1
2 ) (1,−1)
L (0, 0) (0, 0) ( 12 ,−
1
2 ) (1,−1)
B (− 12 ,
1
2 ) (−
1
2 ,
1
2 ) (0, 0) (−
1
2 ,
1
2 )
A (−1, 1) (−1, 1) ( 12 ,−
1
2 ) (0, 0)
Table 3.1: 4x4 Matrix: s0 Normal-Form Game
P4
P5
R L B A
R (0, 0) (0, 0) ( 12 ,−
1
2 ) (−1, 1)
L (0, 0) (0, 0) ( 12 ,−
1
2 ) (1,−1)
B (− 12 ,
1
2 ) (−
1
2 ,
1
2 ) (0, 0) (0, 0)
A (−1, 1) (1,−1) (0, 0) (0, 0)
Table 3.2: 4x4 Matrix: s1 Normal-Form Game
P4
P5
R L B A
R (0, 0) (0, 0) ( 12 ,−
1
2 ) (1,−1)
L (0, 0) (0, 0) ( 12 ,−
1
2 ) (−1, 1)
B (− 12 ,
1
2 ) (−
1
2 ,
1
2 ) (0, 0) (0, 0)
A (1,−1) (−1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0)
Table 3.3: 4x4 Matrix: s2 Normal-Form Game
3.0.8 Transition of states based on actions taken
The actions taken in one state leads to the player to move in a different state this can be shown in
the following transition table. If both the player take same action then they end up reaching same state.
State S3 is the terminal state where the game ends. The game can start from any of the initial state
S0,S1 and S2. However it won’t start from state S3.
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Transition table for Game I
4 5 From State S0 From State S1 From State S2
R R S0 S1 S2
L R S2 S0 S1
B R S1 S2 S0
A R S1 S3 S0
R L S1 S2 S0
L L S0 S1 S2
B L S2 S0 S1
A L S3 S0 S1
R B S2 S0 S1
L B S1 S2 S0
B B S0 S1 S2
A B S0 S1 S2
R A S3 S0 S1
L A S1 S3 S1
B A S0 S1 S2
A A S3 S3 S3
The above transition table provides environment restriction while a game is being played.
3.1 Game theoretic solution for the Attack Game
Figure 3.2: There are multiple Nash equilibriums (R,R) , (R,L), (L,R),(L,L)
Figure 3.3: pure stage game S1 equilibrium (L,R)
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Figure 3.4: pure stage game S2 equilibrium (R,L)
Nash equilibrium
1. There are multiple Nash equilibria for state s0 (R,R) , (R,L), (L,R) & (L,L),
2. Nash equilibrium for state s1 is (L,R)
3. Nash equilibrium for state s2 is (R,L).
The above solution for individual stage provides an interesting incites to the problem. In the first
stage of the game the player is indifferent between the R and L. This means the player will play the
game with a range of probabilities. All the range of probabilities over R and L are Nash equilibrium.
For State S1, from the perspective of player4, the player is certain about playing action L. This
is because Player receives more incentives to play L rather than R. This is due to the presence of
negative reward if the player5 chooses move A.
Similar explanation stands for player4 but in the reverse way. If one observes the payoff received
by player playing R gets player more incentive as compared to R. This is also due to the presence of
negative rewards corresponding to A move of other player if player4 selects L.
Mixed strategy
It will be interesting to see what mixed strategy players will apply while playing the game. The
following is the description how the player will select a mixed strategy for state S0 and State S1. The
same concept can be extended to the state S2.
State S0
P4
P5
R L
R 0 0
L 0 0
Table 3.4: 4x4 Matrix: s0 Reduced Normal-Form Game by Iterative deletion of dominant strategy
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Consider the normal form of state S0, it can be seen that the payoff recieved by player 4 for R
and L are same and at the same time player 4 is better off playing R and L as compared to B and
A.The normal form can be reduced using applying iterative deletion of dominant strategy. The strat-
egy which won’t be ever is removed and what is left, player mixes with those actions. The reduced
Normal form will be as shown above.
In the reduced Normal form, we can see player is indifferent to the action. Hence the following is
the range where probabilities lies
PR ∈ [0, 1]
PL ∈ [0, 1]
under the constraints,
PR + PL = 1
State S1
It can be seen that for state S2 by Iterative deletion of dominant strategy, the normal form is reduced
to the following form The expected payoff for the player4 is shown as follows
P4
P5
R L A
R 0 0 -1
L 0 0 1
A -1 1 0
Table 3.5: 4x4 Matrix: s1 Reduced Normal-Form Game by Iterative deletion of dominant strategy
E4(R) = −1 + p+ q
E4(L) = 1− p− q
E4(A) = −p+ q
Equating, E4(R) = E4(L)
−1 + p+ q = 1− p− q
p+ q = 1
This shows
PA = 0
The negation will be expected payoff recieved by5 when it plays probability p and q.
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p q Payoff for P5 Payoff for P5 Payoff for P5
PR PL P4 → R P4 → L P4 → A
0 1 0 0 -1
1 0 0 0 1
0.5 0.5 0 0 0
0.25 0.75 0 0 -0.5
0.75 0.25 0 0 0.5
0.51 0.49 0 0 0.01
Table 3.6: Expected payoff for P5 for mixing different probabilities
The above table shows the expected payoff which it receives for the mixing PR and PL, This means
PR ≥ PL
.The reason for this is player P5 receives atleast 0 or better than that for the probabilities. Mixed
strategy will be as follows:
PR ≥ PL
under constraints
PR + PL = 1
,
PR ≥ 0.5
PL ≤ 0.5
Similar explanation can be given for Player P4 and also for State S2
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Methodology
1. The above game can be seen as a optimisation problem in which one has to find a solution from
a search space which is optimal. The solution will be a mixed strategy for sure (as per Nash’s
dissertation we always have a mixed strategy equilibrium for a game). One of the way to solve
such a problem and find a solution is using Genetic Algorithm and Coevolutionary algorithm
[12] [24]. Which are essentially same thing the only difference is in coevolutionary algorithm
Multiple GA are run in parallel with interactions.
2. In each state of the game the player will play their action with certain probabilities[18]. The
optimal strategy is defined by the strategies developed in each stage.
3. The following probabilities in this case will be
P1(a/s0), P1(a/s1), P1(a/s2)
P2(a/s0), P2(a/s1), P2(a/s2)
For the matrix game in state s0 we will have a solution which will be
Generation Optimal Value P4(R/s0) P4(L/s0) P4(B/s0) P4(A/s0)
Gx value p1 p2 p3 p4
Gy value q1 q2 q3 q4
Table 4.1: solution for P4 s0
The above table consists of (p,q) which are probabilities under constraint
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1
q1 + q2 + q3 + q4 = 1
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4.1 Co-Evolutionary Algorithm
Genetic Algorithm
Genetic algorithm mimics the concept of natural evolution. In an optimisation problems it reaches to
a stable solution which is close to or the optimal point in search. Genetic algorithm basic structure
which has been used in the research can be explained as
However, the above structure is useful to identify strategy for either of the player.[12] [8]. Instead of
Figure 4.1: Genetic Algorithm Outline
running multiple instances of GA one after the another we can run them in parallel this can be done
using Co-Evolutionary algorithm [22]. Each instance of evolve into a species of individuals which
are good at particular tasks.
1. Gene : Each gene represents the value of probability the player assigns to the actions.
2. Evolution of the population : During evolution stage each individual is matched against each
other individuals for a fixed number of time.
3. Selection : Based on the result of the game the best players are selected to mate and produce
offspring.
4. Crossover : The selected parents are allowed to reproduce to new generation.
5. Mutation : The selected chromosome is mutated one bit mutation.
6. New generation: New generation is selected from the pool of children depending on the fitness
of the generated offspring.
The game which we are looking at is a purely competitive game, and with multiple stages while
searching for solution in such one may encounter more than one optimal solution. These solutions
are optimal when all objectives are into consideration and are Paretooptimal solutions [35]
Multiobjective Optimization Problem:
We have multiple objective functions each for individual states this objective functions are aggregated
to form a composite function which can be optimised at once.
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Genetic algorithm mimics the concept of natural evolution. In an optimisation problems it reaches to
a stable solution which is close to or the optimal point in search. Genetic algorithm basic structure
which has been used in the research can be explained as
Figure 4.2: Coevolutionary Algorithm Outline
4.2 Solving s0 as an example by Hand
Based on [25].
4.2.1 Population and Gene
1. The above game is a zero sum game, one player’s loss is other player’s gain.
2. The player does not require to have any memory to play against each other. So the representa-
tion does not require the encoding of the memory as it is required in other games discussed in
literature.
3. The player plays with certain mixed strategy. (Nash: Every game have a mixed strategy equi-
librium)
4. This strategies are evolved for the players. The probabilities are evolved over time which may
converge within the optimal strategy.
The initial example population
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Gene P1(L/s0) P1(R/s0) P1(A/s0) P1(L/s0)
1 0.15 0.15 0.4 0.30
2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2
3 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.7
4 0.65 0.05 0.05 0.25
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
Table 4.2: Gene example for P4 s0 population
This above population and encoding.[17] An example of encoding a value of the probability to be
encoded is as follows: 0.5 to be encoded.
Population size: N = 24
The length of the string of each parameter = 8
The equation used for this is as follows:
P1 = P1min +
b
2pL
(P1max − P1min)
So for the above example it will be
0.5 = 0− b
28 − 1
(1− 0)
binary representation is given by:
b = 0.5(28 − 1)
Now this decimal number can be converted into binary
B = dec2bin(127.5000, 8) =′ 01111111′
4.2.2 Fitness Function
The implementation is being developed based on example [12] . Consider a zero sum game with m x
n matrix.
For such a game Player 1 optimum mixed strategy will satisfy
Max[Min(
m∑
i=1
ai1p1(ai1/s0),
m∑
i=1
ai2p1(ai2/s0), ....,
m∑
i=1
ainp1(ain/s0))]
Subject to the constraints
p1(ai1/s0) ≥ 0 , i=1,,m and
∑m
i=1 p1(ai1/s0) = 1
A similar objective function can be defined for player 2:
Min[Max(
n∑
i=1
ai1p2(ai1/s0),
n∑
i=1
ai2p2(ai2/s0), ....,
n∑
i=1
ainp2(aim/s0))]
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Subject to the constraints
p2(ai1/s0) ≥ 0 , i=1,,n and
∑n
i=1 p2(ai1/s0) = 1
An Example for the fitness value calculation is Say the example probability are
Gene P1(L/s0) P1(R/s0) P1(A/s0) P1(L/s0)
decimal 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
Binary encoding 01100110 00110011 00110011 00110011
Table 4.3: P4 s0 example and corresponding binary encoding
s0 P5
P4 R L B A
R 0 0 0.5 1
L 0 0 0.5 1
B −0.5 −0.5 0 −0.5
A −1 −1 0.5 0
Table 4.4: Game Matrix in state s0
Simplifying the objective function for a single person and in terms of the game can be written as
objV alue =Max
Min

0 ∗ P1(L/s0) + 0 ∗ P1(R/s0) + (−0.5) ∗ P1(B/s0) + (−1) ∗ P1(A/s0)
0 ∗ P1(L/s0) + 0 ∗ P1(R/s0) + (−0.5) ∗ P1(B/s0) + (−1) ∗ P1(A/s0)
0.5 ∗ P1(L/s0) + 0.5 ∗ P1(R/s0) + 0 ∗ P1(B/s0) + 0.5 ∗ P1(A/s0)
1 ∗ P1(L/s0) + 1 ∗ P1(R/s0) + (−0.5) ∗ P1(B/s0) + 0 ∗ P1(A/s0)


=Max
Min

0 ∗ 0.4 + 0 ∗ 0.2 + (−0.5) ∗ 0.2 + (−1) ∗ 0.2
0 ∗ 0.4 + 0 ∗ 0.2 + (−0.5) ∗ 0.2 + (−1) ∗ 0.2
0.5 ∗ 0.4 + 0.5 ∗ 0.2 + 0 ∗ 0.2 + 0.5 ∗ 0.2
1 ∗ 0.4 + 1 ∗ 0.2 + (−0.5) ∗ 0.2 + 0 ∗ 0.2

 =Max
Min

−0.3000
−0.3000
0.4000
0.5000


=Max
Min

−0.3000
−0.3000
0.4000
0.5000


= −0.300
Gene P1(L/s0) P1(R/s0) P1(A/s0) P1(L/s0) Objective Function
1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.30
2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 -0.70
3 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 -0.15
Table 4.5: fitness function value P4 s0 population
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Gene P1(L/s0) P1(R/s0) P1(A/s0) P1(L/s0)
decimal 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
Binary encoding 01100110 00110011 00110011 00110011
decimal 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6
Binary encoding 00011001 00011001 00110011 10011001
decimal 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1
Binary encoding 01100110 01100110 00011001 00011001
Table 4.6: P4 s0 population with binary encoded values
Chromosome fitness value
01100110 | 00110011 | 00110011 | 00110011 -0.3
00011001 | 00011001 | 00110011 | 10011001 -0.7
01100110 | 01100110 | 00011001 | 00011001 -0.15
Table 4.7: P4 s0 binary encoded population
4.2.3 Selection:
Selection is the process to select the individual from the population to reproduce. One can identify
the fittest from the population and select them to mate however this may lead to a wrong convergence.
In order to ensure we avoid this, one needs to maintain diversity in the selection process.
Here we use Tournament Selection
1. The fitness values are normalised
The normalised values are as follows:
Chromosome fitness value Normalised value
01100110 | 00110011 | 00110011 | 00110011 -0.3 0.2609
00011001 | 00011001 | 00110011 | 10011001 -0.7 0.6087
01100110 | 01100110 | 00011001 | 00011001 -0.15 0.1304
Table 4.8: P4 s0 population with fitness and noramlised values
Sorted list:
Chromosome fitness value Normalised value
00011001 | 00011001 | 00110011 | 10011001 -0.7 0.6087
01100110 | 00110011 | 00110011 | 00110011 -0.3 0.2609
01100110 | 01100110 | 00011001 | 00011001 -0.15 0.1304
Table 4.9: P4 s0 population
Let a number is selected at random, R = 0.2 The chromosome greater or equal to 0.2 is selected.
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Selected Chromosome
parent 1 00011001 | 00011001 | 00110011 | 10011001
parent 2 01100110 | 00110011 | 00110011 | 00110011
Table 4.10: P4 s0 sorted population with respect to fitness
4.2.4 Crossover:
Crossover point is selected at random: Let say it happens at 14
Selected Chromosome
parent 1 00011001 | 000110-01 | 00110011 | 10011001
parent 2 01100110 | 001100-11 | 00110011 | 00110011
Table 4.11: Crossover: selected parents
Crossover example:
Selected Chromosome
child 1 00011001 | 000110-11 | 00110011 | 00110011
child 2 01100110 | 001100-01 | 00110011 | 10011001
Table 4.12: Crossover childrens
The problem here is the selection with the child or the offspring as we can see the children are as
follows
Selected Chromosome total
child 1 0.098 | 0.1059 | 0.2 | 0.2 0.6039
child 2 0.4 | 0.1922 | 0.2 | 0.6 1.3922
Table 4.13: Decoded Childrens from crossover
The genome being a distribution of probability on the set of actions, We must need to add con-
straints to crossover and mutation operator.
The following are the constraints that must be satisfied
N = 4, support : i ⊂ (1,2,3,4)
0 ≤ Pi ≤ 1
Thus,crossover and mutations have to be performed carefully in order to generate individuals with
genomes. It is not difficult to observe that all the crossover operators commonly used in the literature
can be used in this case if followed by normalisation step to correct the genome to have all the genes
summing up to 1.
The normalisation also introduces an additional mutation component because the generated genome
does not necessarily contains the same genes as the parents.
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Normalised representation:
Selected Chromosome total
child 1 0.1623 | 0.1754 | 0.3312 | 0.3312 1.000
binary 00101001 | 00101100 | 01010100 | 01010100 11111111
child 2 0.2873 | 0.1381 | 0.1437 | 0.4310 1.000
binary 01001001 | 00100011 | 00100100 | 01101101 11111111
Table 4.14: P4 normalised
4.2.5 Mutation:
A single bit mutation is being added to the selected individuals.
4.2.6 Fitness Evaluation:
The process repeats for the number of plays in each iteration for both the players. The fitness is not
only evaluated for individual they are also evaluated based on the other population. This is done on
by matching the population with the best player of the other population.
New population is created then this process is repeated till the algorithm converges to an expected
fitness or the number of maximum generations are over.
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5
Simulation
5.1 Simulation for Individual States using CoEv
The Game defined is a multistage zero sum game, however the individual stages can be considered
as a distinct problem and solved for. If considered separately, Individual stages can be looked at as
a single objective optimisation problems, which can be solved using Coevolutionary algorithm. This
simulation performs individual stage optimisation in order to find optimal mixed strategy equilib-
ria. Solution is compared with the Nash equilibrium obtained in order to establish relevance of the
algorithm. Further, This simulation allows us to identify.
1. How an agent or a player would select the mixed strategy if evolved for playing individual
stages?
2. Does this Coevolution corresponds to the Nash equilibrium strategies obtained earlier?
3. Can a solution for the individual be considered as optimal solution?
5.1.1 Individual Stage Game S0 simulation
Parameters Values
N 48
CR 0.35
MR 0.4
I 96
(a) Parameters
State Player PRight PLeft PBlock PAttack Gx
S-I
s0 P4 0.4188 0.5812 0 0 22
s0 P5 0.3345 0.6655 0 0 22
S-II
s0 P4 0.3494 0.6506 0 0 28
s0 P5 0.446 0.554 0 0 28
(b) Probabilities observed through simulations
Table 5.1: Parameters used for simulation S0 and converged probabilities
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(a) Fitness (b) Converged Probabilities
Figure 5.1: State S0 simulation I
(a) Fitness (b) Converged Probabilities
Figure 5.2: State S0 simulation II
The simulation
5.1.2 Individual Stage Game S1 simulation
Parameters Values
N 48
CR 0.35
MR 0.4
I 96
(a) Parameters
State Player PRight PLeft PBlock PAttack Gx
S-I
s0 P4 0.3729 0.6271 0 0 25
s0 P5 0.708 0.292 0 0 25
S-II
s0 P4 0.2767 0.7233 0 0 24
s0 P5 0.6481 0.3519 0 0 24
(b) Probabilities observed through simulations
Table 5.2: Parameters used for simulation S1 and converged probabilities
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(a) Fitness (b) Converged Probabilities
Figure 5.3: State S1 simulation I
(a) Fitness (b) Converged Probabilities
Figure 5.4: State S1 simulation II
5.1.3 Individual Stage Game S2 simulation
Simulation for state S2
Parameters Values
N 48
CR 0.35
MR 0.4
I 96
(a) Parameters
State Player PRight PLeft PBlock PAttack Gx
S-I
s0 P4 0.6815 0.3185 0 0 26
s0 P5 0.3787 0.6213 0 0 26
S-II
s0 P4 0.6529 0.3471 0 0 28
s0 P5 0.4193 0.5807 0 0 28
(b) Probabilities observed through simulations
Table 5.3: Parameters used for simulation S2 and converged probabilities
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(a) Fitness (b) Converged Probabilities
Figure 5.5: State S2 simulation I
(a) Fitness (b) Converged Probabilities
Figure 5.6: State S2 simulation II
5.1.4 Observation
Multiple crossover rate and mutation rate
State Player PRight PLeft PBlock PAttack
s0 P4 0 ≤ PR ≤ 1 0 ≤ PL ≤ 1 PB = 0 PA = 0
s1 P4 0 ≤ PR ≤ 0.5 0.5 ≤ PL ≤ 1 PB = 0 PA = 0
s2 P4 0.5 ≤ PR ≤ 1 0 ≤ PL ≤ 0.5 PB = 0 PA = 0
s0 P5 0 ≤ PR ≤ 1 0 ≤ PL ≤ 1 PB = 0 PA = 0
s1 P5 0.5 ≤ PR ≤ 1 0 ≤ PL ≤ 0.5 PB = 0 PA = 0
s2 P5 0 ≤ PR ≤ 0.5 0.5 ≤ PL ≤ 1 PB = 0 PA = 0
Table 5.4: Probabilities observed through simulations
1. There is a large number of strategies as a solution for the Game.
2. Probabilities for Attack and block for all the stages and players is converging to zero which
means players won’t be benefited by playing those in the game.
3. Probabilities for moves Right and Left fluctuate between a range, indeterminate which one to
select for sure, player appears to be benefited with all the probability combinations.
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5.1.5 Analysis
As one can observe, Solution for individual states S0, S1, S2 defined in section ”Game Definition” of
”Game and Game Solution” does not have a unique Nash equilibrium.
State Nash equilibria: (P4,P5)
s0 (R,R), (R,L), (L,R), (L,L)
s1 (L,R)
s2 (R,L)
Table 5.5: Nash equilibria
With a superficial observation, a changing outcome of table 5.1 may seem improbable but this is not
true. One can clearly observe
1. According to the data obtained from the simulations one can observe that the problem of indi-
vidual stage i.e single objective optimisation of stage is a problem with infinite solution set.
The above statements can further be supported by investigating pay-off matrix
1. Evolving Player, P4 for state S0 receives same pay-off irrespective of move Right or Left. This
makes player indifferent to this moves. This indifference is projected in the form of different
probabilities convergence for different initial population of the players.
2. Evolving player P4, for state S1, taps more probability on the Left as opposed to Right. This
can be explained with the pay-off matrix: The pay-off matrix shows that player P4 receives
same pay-off for action right and left if the player P5 plays right, left or block however if
the player P5 plays Attack, Left is a better move for player P4 as it receives 1 in this case
whereas right move causes a loss of 1. This is also translated into the range of probabilities
P4 which is Pright in-between 0 and 0.5. i.e Right has a lower probabilities. This thought
can further be cemented by considering how CoEv is implemented for individual stage. The
player P4 is maximising whereas player P5 is minimizing. As in case of procedure to find
Nash equilibrium. However, due to the presence of many optimal solution in the search space a
saddle-point can be reached with different permutation and combination of probabilities. This
is reason for different probabilities convergence.
3. A similar explanation holds true for other stages as well.
5.1.6 Conclusion for the simulation
CoEvolution mimics Nash equilibrium. Player P4 is maximising and player P5 is minimizing while
evolving. The individual stages can be modelled as an optimisation problem however they are infinite
solution set. There are many combination of probabilities of Right and Left which can form a saddle
point and make the algorithm converge.Also, It is clear from the simulation that it is the rationality of
the player not to select Moves Attack or block.
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5.2 Simulations for Multistage Game using CoEv Algorithm
5.2.1 Simulation
Simulation explores the following idea
1. What difference can one observe about players that are Co-Evolved for individual stage and
multiple stages?
2. Does Co-Evolution for Multiple stages converges to a specific probability set instead of range
of probabilities?
3. Why this happens?
Multistage results
Parameters Values
Gx 33
N 48
CR 0.35
MR 0.4
I 96
(a) Parameters
Player PRight PLeft PBlock PAttack
P4 0.4999 0.5001 0 0
P5 0.5 0.5 0 0
(b) Probabilities observed through simulations
Table 5.6: Parameters used for simulation and converged probabilities
(a) Fitness (b) Converged Probabilities
Figure 5.7: State S0 + S1 + S2 simulation I
5.2.2 Observations
1. Unlike Single objective Case, Multi-Objective Co-evolution converges to a specific probability
point(0.5,0.5,0,0).
2. No matter how many times the process is repeated the solution is converged to same point.
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5.2.3 Analysis
Table shows the range of probabilities for individual stages. This shows the valid probabilities that can
occur in the individual stages. From the results we can observe, The mixed strategy is [0.5,0.5,0,0].
This is a valid probability for all the states.
1. The player tries to be good at all the three stages. This can be viewed as an intersection of the
range of probabilities for all the stages.
2. The same player can play all the three games and entire game.
5.2.4 Conclusion for the simulation
Instead of multiple mixed strategies, when the game is treated as Multi-objective optimisation prob-
lem where objective function is converted into a composite function, a single mixed strategy is
evolved. Convergence is a result of optimisation of all the function at the same time. Here, the
converged mixed strategy is an intersection of solutions of all three stages of game. This makes
evolved player to play in all the three stages with the same mixed strategy.
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5.3 Simulation for Parameters with optimal Computation time
5.3.1 Simulation
A mixed strategy has been identified by the co-evolutionary algorithm in the above simulations. Here
Computational speed or time has not been considered. Ideally, Computational time should be as small
as possible. This simulation tries to do the following
1. How Computational speed is affected by parameters involved in Co-Evolutionary Algorithm?
2. Can we identify a relationship between the parameter and Computational time?
3. Can parameters values be identified for optimal Computational speed?
Changing mutation rate and crossover rate
(a) S-24 (b) S-48
Figure 5.8: Interactions 24 and 48
(a) S-72 (b) S-96
Figure 5.9: Interactions 72 and 96
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(a) S-120 (b) S-144
Figure 5.10: Interactions 120 and 144
(a) Fitness (b) S-192
Figure 5.11: Interactions 168 and 192
(a) S-216 (b) S-240
Figure 5.12: Interactions 216 and 240
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5.3.2 Observation
1. A relationship between Generations and Interactions which is non-linear in nature can be ob-
served.
2. The figures shows the change in the interactions with a constant population size of 48.
3. It can be seen that the increase in the interaction reduces the number of generations. Figures
5.8 and 5.9 shows for a mating pool size or interactions of more than 1.5 times of population
size. The range over which convergence occur increases with the increase in interactions and
number of generations took for convergence reduces.
4. Figure 5.10 to 5.12 shows the range over which convergence occur increases however, it unlike
earlier figures Generations aren’t that effected by change in interactions.
5. For a Mutation Rate of 0, No matter what the crossover rate and mating pool size is no conver-
gence occurs.
5.3.3 Analysis
1. The reason for reduction in the number of generation with the interaction can be explained with
the selection probability of an individual from the population. The equation is been explained in
the next section ”Derivation for computational time”. As the Number of interactions increases.
There is an exponential increase in the probability of an individual being selected.
2. This increase reflects in a better representation of population. This also results in participation
of individual in mutation and crossover. Thus population goes through lot of diversity. Diver-
sity results in exploration in the search space which results in lesser number of Generations.
This is reflected in figure 5.10 to 5.12.
5.4 Derivation for Computational time
probability of an individual from the population is selected is given by
Pindividual =
1
N
Probability of selection for Crossover or mutation
1. Probability of selection of an individual from a population of N is
1
N
2. Probability of an individual not being selected in one interaction is
1− 1
N
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3. Probability of an individual not being selected in two interaction is
(1− 1
N
) ∗ (1− 1
N
)
4. Probability of an individual not being selected in I interaction is
(1− 1
N
)I
5. Probability of being selected atleast once in I interaction is
PS = 1− (1−
1
N
)I
Diversity in Generations:
Diversity in the population is induced through Mutation rate and crossover rate which can be ex-
pressed as
Diversity =Mr + Cr
Probability that crossover occurs on the selected individual
probability of A such that B has happened
P (A|B) = P (A ∩B)
P (B)
therefore
P (A ∩B) = P (B) ∗ P (A|B)
PCr is Cr which is nothing but P (A|B)
Thus, Probability of crossover such that an individual is selected is given by
PCr ∗ PS
P (Cs) = (CR) ∗ (1− (1−
1
N
)I)
Probability that crossover occurs on the selected individual
Similarly, Mutation happen on the selected individual is given by
(Mr) ∗ (1− (1−
1
N
)I)
Mutation and crossover occur independently of each other and Probability of two independent event
is given by
P (A ∩B) = P (A) ∗ P (B)
P (Cs ∩Ms) = (Cr) ∗ (Mr) ∗ (1− (1−
1
N
)I)2
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Probability of Crossover or Mutation or both on selected individual
Probability on two mutually exclusive event is given as follows
P (A ∪B ∪ both) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A ∩B)
P (Cs∪Ms∪both) = (CR ∗ (1− (1−
1
N
)I)+(MR ∗ (1− (1−
1
N
)I)− (Cr ∗Mr ∗ (1− (1−
1
N
)I)2)
P (Cs ∪Ms ∪ both) = (CR +MR) ∗ (1− (1−
1
N
)I)− (Cr ∗Mr ∗ (1− (1−
1
N
)I)2)
The above probability is for single individual and its selection probability for mutation and crossover.
Total time
Total time taken per generation for mutation and crossover over the entire population,
T = (tM ∗MR + tC ∗ CR + tNc ∗ (1− CR) + tMis) ∗ I
where,
tM = time taken for a single mutation.
tC = time taken for a single crossover.
tNC= time taken for single non-crossover case.
tMis = time taken for miscellaneous process.
Equation:
Total time will also include Fitness computation time TF
Ttotal = T + TF
Total time taken G Generations,
TG = G ∗ TTotal
5.4.1 Relation between Generation, Interaction and Time taken
Generation & Interactions
The figure below shows the computational time required by using different Mutation rate and Crossover
rate over a range of Interaction range [24,600].
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(a) MR = 0, CR = 0 (b) MR = 0, CR = 1
Figure 5.13: Plot for G Vs I, Computation time Vs I and Total time Vs I
(a) MR = 1, CR = 0 (b) MR = 1, CR = 1
Figure 5.14: Plot for G Vs I, Computation time Vs I and Total time Vs I
(a) MR = 0.75, CR = 0.75 (b) MR = 0.25, CR = 0.25
Figure 5.15: Plot for G Vs I, Computation time Vs I and Total time Vs I
(a) MR = 0.5, CR = 0.5 (b) MR = 0.4, CR = 0.35
Figure 5.16: Plot for G Vs I, Computation time Vs I and Total time Vs I
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Observations
1. First the computation time taken for crossover and mutation of an individual is constant through
out the process. Again the population size is constant which also leads to a consistent fitness
calculation time.
2. As it can be seen from the equation for computation time, Mutation rate and crossover rate
effects the total computational time.
3. This can be verified from the figures above which shows
(a) Fig. 5.13 shows for a MR = CR = 0, takes a long computation time which is obvious
since there is no convergence
(b) Fig 5.13 also shows a MR = 1 and CR = 0, for a smaller size of Interactions, No
convergence occurs. However convergence starts from interaction size of 96. This is also
the point where computation time is the least.
(c) Fig. 5.14 shows for a MR = 0, CR = 1 no convergence occur which is in accordance to
the earlier finding.
(d) Fig. 5.14 also shows for a MR = 1, CR = 1 the least amount of time taken is for an
interaction size of 120
(e) Fig 5.15 and 5.16 reiterate the finding but with a different MR and CR
(f) Fig 5.16 gives a better representation which shows least amount of time taken is for an
Interaction size of 96.
4. point around appears to be the sweet spot which requires least amount of time in all cases.
5. The least of amount of time taken by the simulations where in the case of MR = 0.4and
CR = 0.35 which is voids the notion that a smaller crossover and smaller mutation will take
less computation time.
6. An important pattern which is in all the figures, there is the gradual increase in the computation
time after interaction size of 96.
Analysis
1. Convergence occurs depending on the mutation rate , crossover rate and interactions size for
the coevolving population. From the observation of previous section, one can note that without
mutation no convergence occurs. Since there is no convergence the algorithm will be executed
till the maximum allowable generation. Thus it takes higher computation time.
2. For most of the simulation convergence of the population occurs quicker for a mating pool
size of 96. which is twice the size of population and from the developed equation of selection
probability, one can see the selection probability is around 0.86.
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3. For higher interactions the selection probability increases
Figure 5.17: PS vs I
4. The above plot shows that after interaction of 240 there is not much change in the selection
probability.
5. Higher Mutation rate and crossover rate takes a bit longer time for convergence.However,
Lower Mutation rate and crossover rate does not guarantee the least computational time. There
is a range of Mutation rate and Crossover rate where computation time is less.
5.4.2 Comparison between values Actual time and real time taken for Inter-
action
Time is calculated from the equation derived in the derivation section. The derived time is plotted
over actual time taken by the entire crossover, mutation and other involved process. This is shown in
the figure below.
1. With the help of time for a single iteration an approximate time taken for the population to
go through the mutation, crossover and other process can be observed which is then used for
plotting.
2. The plotted time is for interactions 24 to 336 with a intermediate gap of 24 where x-axis is the
combination of mutation rate and crossover rate. This is such that For a certain mutation rate
Crossover rate changes from 0 to 1 with a gap of 0.05. There are 441 such combinations.
3. From the previous section, Interaction size of about 96 has been a good approximate for the
convergence of the generations for various combination of mutation and crossover rate.
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Figure 5.18: Game I States and their equivalent representation s0,s1,s2
Observations and Analysis:
1. For higher interaction size the approximation has errors as compared to the actual time taken.
2. The time is calculated based on the processor of the machine it is running. Also, for most of the
machines the time taken will vary based on the time allocated by the processor on the execution
of the process.This causes a difference in the actual and calculated time.
5.5 Conclusion
There is no single point of mutation range and crossover rate for optimum computation time however
a range which can be stated as Mutation rate ∈ [0.2,0.5],Crossover rate ∈ [0.2,0.6] and Interaction
Size ∈ [72,120]. From the range a point is selected for application to the new game which is as
follows: This is because the time taken for the calculation is minimum for the simulation for different
Figure 5.19: Game I States and their equivalent representation s0,s1,s2
range of Mutation rate and Crossover rate. The selected point is MR = 0.4,CR = 0.35, and I = 96.
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Game 2: Movement Game
As opposed to the Horizontal Movement Game this game has been defined with not only horizontal
but also with vertical movement. The horizontal and vertical movements takes the game a step close
to the real world implementation. A deterministic game is the one in which if one takes certain ac-
tions he will reach to a unique result. We don’t have any randomness in the process.
6.0.1 Players
Player4and Player5 .
6.0.2 Environment
Zero sum Two player deterministic game is played in the following environment. There are four
positions in the grid possible for the player to be in
6.0.3 Actions
Actions available for the players are
1. Right : Player moves to the right
2. Left : Player moves to the left
3. Up: Player moves up.
4. Down: Player moves down.
5. Block : Player tries to block the anticipated attack
6. Attack: Player Attacks.
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6.0.4 States
Based on the players(5 and 4) and Action set (R,L,U,D,B,A) the number of states are defined as
follows: The game consists of the following environment
Figure 6.1: Game II States s0,s1,s2,s3
6.0.5 Utility
The game is defined as Zero sum Game, and hence one player loss is the other player’s gain.The
payoff matrix is defined for each state.
Since the game is a zero sum game,
u4(action1, action2) = −u5(action1, action2)
6.0.6 Representation choice
Conventionally, the states would have been defined in the terms of relative positions, which would
lead to 16 individual states. The way we have defined the game is to condense the multiple state
into a single one which has same normal form. The only difference between the way in which we
have defined is the transition of the agents into different states this happens because of occurrence of
invalid state in the conventional game representation. Unlike the previous game the agent is allowed
to move in the vertical direction as well.
6.0.7 Normal form representation of the states
P4
P5
MH MV B A
MH 0 0 0.5 1
MV 0 0 0.5 1
B -0.5 -0.5 0 -0.5
A -1 -1 0.5 0
Table 6.1: 4x4 Matrix: s0 Normal-Form Game
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P4
P5
MH MV B A
MH 0 0 0.5 -1
MV 0 0 0.5 1
B -0.5 -0.5 0 0.5
A 1 -1 -0.5 0
Table 6.2: 4x4 Matrix: s1 Normal-Form Game
P4
P5
MH MV B A
MH 0 0 0.5 1
MV 0 0 0.5 -1
B -0.5 -0.5 0 0.5
A -1 1 -0.5 0
Table 6.3: 4x4 Matrix: s2 Normal-Form Game
P4
P5
MH MV B A
MH 0 0 0.5 1
MV 0 0 0.5 1
B -0.5 -0.5 0 0.5
A -1 -1 -0.5 0
Table 6.4: 4x4 Matrix: s3 Normal-Form Game
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6.1 Simulation
1. Can Game I crossover and mutation range be used for Game II?
Parameters Values
Gx 37
N 48
CR 0.4
MR 0.35
I 96
(a) Parameters
Player PRight PLeft PBlock PAttack
P4 0.5 0.5 0 0
P5 0.5 0.5 0 0
(b) Probabilities observed through simulations
Table 6.5: Parameters used for simulation and converged probabilities
(a) Fitness (b) Converged Probabilities
Figure 6.2: State S0 + S1 + S2 + S3 simulation I
6.2 Observation and Analysis
1. Convergence occurs with the given Mutation rate and crossover rate.
2. The converged values are [0.5,0.5,0,0].
3. Since the games are similar to each other only differing by single state, Convergence of the
game is same as the previous game.
6.3 Conclusion
The selected mutation rate, crossover rate and interaction size developed from the earlier game can
be applied to the new game. This proves the hypothesis that parameters can be used for convergence.
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7
Discussion
7.1 Future Work
7.1.1 Multiple task Learning
The same methodology can be applied to Multiple task learning which are of similar nature. If one
selects to apply Co evolutionary algorithm to the Multi task Learning problem. One can take into
account similar approach which is applied in the thesis. If the tasks are considered as the stage of the
game. The problem then can be reduced to essentially the same problem discussed in the research.
7.1.2 Thesis Extension
Research can be extended in numerous ways. Few of the extensions are discussed below in brief
Larger grid world
The problem can be extended to a larger grid world. This will be interesting to see how the agents
behave in a world bigger than the current grid. The same representation can still hold good. However
one may need to keep one more pointer to identify the edges of the game where action set will vary.
Interesting action set
The problem can be modelled with interesting set of actions apart from left,right,up, down,block and
attack. This may also include diagonal movement.
More than two agents
It will be interesting to see how more than two agents behave in the given environment. The concept
of cooperation may arrive in such a situation. That will be a more generalised solution to real world
problems.
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Reinforcement learning
A complete system can be created using reinforcement learning, where reinforcement learning can
be used to learn unknown environment and the obtained rewards matrix can be used to generate a
solution using CoEvolutionary algorithm.
7.1.3 Application of research
Direct application can be seen in development of two player game with an intelligent agent. The
agent is evolved in reference to diverse population. This scenario can be applied to most of the real
life situations such as bargaining, where one stage can be considered as first amount told, based on
this outcome a new game is presented and so on till a termination case is reached. Such scenario
are endless, and can be found in various subjects. Thus the application of the research is wide. The
papers [28], [20] which show applications of similar research to different fields
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8
Conclusion
There are main two perspective from where the research can be viewed at
1. For a zero sum multi-stage game , coEvolutionary algorithm can be used to find a solution.
However this is with a caution that the objective function should have a common set of optimal
solution. For a disjoint stage matrices where there is no presence of common solution set,
Agent may end up performing worst in the game.
2. Coevolutionary algorithm can be applied to the Game theory and a solution can be found.
During the research an analysis of the algorithm led to the development of an equation of
computational time with respect to mutation rate, crossover rate, Interaction, and population.
This equation is helpful in cases of applications which takes high computation. A range can
be narrowed down using the equation which is helpful for application of the GA or CoEA that
may take weeks for computation otherwise.
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Summary
Game of fight is analysed in the research. A constrained world where two agents interact with each
other just with horizontal mobility. The translation of the game led to a development of zero sum
multistage game. Analysis through game theory shows, The individual stage solution to the devel-
oped game is an infinite solution set. This is then reiterated through Application of coevolutionary
algorithm to the individual games. However the main motive of the research is to present a solution
of multistage game. This is done by using a composite function as an optimisation function. This
optimised solution is compared with the individual stages where solution set was infinite. However
in case of Multistage game evolution, Game evolved to a probability set of [0.5,0.5,0,0]. Further, An
analysis is done on the algorithm to identify what will be a best set of parameters which will con-
verge the algorithm with possibly least computation time. An novel equation has been developed for
computation time. A range of parameters is identified. Later, a new game is developed and new set
of parameters are applied to it. Convergence occurs with the parameters, this means the parameters
can be reused for new game setting as well.
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